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Chrisman’s recent book develops an account of the semantics and metaseman-
tics of the modal verb and normative expression par excellence, ‘ought’. Arguing
for his preferred semantic rule for ‘ought’ occupies the majority of the book, chap-
ters 2–5. Chapter 1 gives a brief tour of the argumentative landscape, including a
valuable discussion of the distinction between semantics and metasemantics, chap-
ter 6 sketches Chrisman’s own metasemantic picture, and in chapter 7, we get a
brief tour of additional issues such as the connection of his view to issues in moral
psychology and epistemology as well as discussions of other normative expres-
sions like ‘wrong’ and ‘good’.
Chrisman emphasizes throughout the difference between giving a metase-
mantics for normative language and giving a compositional semantics for it. For
Chrisman, a (formal)compositional semantics is a theory of the content of complex
constructions in terms of the content of simpler expressions. Ametasemantics inter-
prets notions like content and mechanisms like composition in terms of the function
of the relevant bit of language. Model-theoretic possible worlds semantics—“worlds”
really beingmathematical structures of some type—is a compositional semantics;
that possible worlds represent ways things could have been and that sets of possi-
ble worlds represent states of information are part of a representationalist meta-
semantical interpretation of it. Compositional semantics imposes some constraints
on metasemantics—since semantic structure partially explains our understanding
of language, a proper semantics will demand of a metasemantics the ability to in-
terpret this structure in a reasonable fashion. Even so, Chrisman argues compel-
lingly that standard compositional semantics takes no stand on which metaseman-
tical picture is correct.
Chrisman claims that some accounts of normative language, like expressi-
vism, are best interpreted as metasemantical views. I am broadly sympathetic,
though it is combinations of semantics and metasemantics—interpreted com-
positional semantics—that are, have been, and should be of primary philosoph-
ical interest. Emphasizing the distinction between metasemantics and formal se-
mantics is most important as a corrective to the perennial mistake of treating
algebraic structures, like bare possible worlds semantics, as accounts of meaning
instead of structure on which to hang a proper account of linguistic meaning.
Chrisman’s metasemantical aim is to develop an alternative to orthodox repre-
sentationalist and expressivist options. His own view is that ought-talk makes ex-
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plicit certain positions in a “space of implications” (187). As I will suggest, this
metasemantical picture faces trouble in providing a natural interpretation of a
formal semantics, at least given the picture’s current stage of development.
His preferred semantics takes ‘ought’ to be a necessity modal. ‘Barry ought
to be pirouetting’ is semantically composed of an operator ought applied to the prop-
ositionBarry is pirouetting (the ‘prejacent’). Following Kratzer, Chrisman presumes
that context fills in two aspects of the meaning of ‘ought’. First, we only consider
certain salient possibilities when we evaluate ‘ought’-claims. When we’re evalu-
ating whether Barry ought to be pirouetting, we’re usually pointedly ignoring
possibilities where his legs will shortly fall off.We thus presume that context specifies
a presupposed body of information which holds in all salient worlds, which we can
represent formally as a function f from a world t to a set of relevant worlds f(t).
Likewise, ‘oughts’ come in different flavors: moral, prudential, evaluative, tele-
ological, and epistemic. Again, following Kratzer, Chrisman presumes that context
specifies a body of information about how to evaluate the relevant flavor of ‘ought’
which in turn induces a partial order g on the salient worlds.
I will use ‘correct’, instead of Chrisman’s ‘1’, as a metasemantically neutral
analogue for ‘true’. Correctness, for simple nonnormative propositions, is treated
in the usual fashion as truth-at-a-world. Chrisman takes as half of his analysis of
‘ought’-claims (represented here asOp) that:
(R10d)Op is correct at t just in case p is correct at every g(t)-maximal world
w in f(t).
That is, when Barry is pirouetting in every salient possibility which is maximal
(not maximum!) in the g(t)-ranking. Presumably, for ‘Barry ought to be pirouetting’,
g ranks worlds according to their desirability. For epistemic ‘ought’-claims, like ‘He
ought to be there now’, g ranks worlds according to something like their likelihood.
Chrisman is sensitive to the difference between agentive ‘oughts’ like ‘You
ought to givemore to charity’ andnonagentive ‘oughts’ like ‘He ought to be home
by now’. To analyze the former, Chrisman makes use of Castañeda’s imperatival
analogue to propositions, practitions (Hector-Neri Castañeda, Thinking and Doing:
The Philosophical Foundations of Institutions [Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1975]). These
can be thought of as connecting an action to an agent in terms of a practical,
not a predicative, copula—<Barry to J> instead of <Barry is F>. Using pairs of
worlds and sets of norms (indicated <w, n>), instead of simply worlds, Chrisman
explains a practition p as being correct at <w, n> just in case n demands p at w.
For example, if t is a world in which Devrim’s house is on fire and k demands
that Devrim care for her property, then <Devrim to go home> is correct at <t, k>.
Chrisman extends the analysis of ‘ought’ to practitions by taking g to rank
world-norm pairs in f(t), the set of world-norm pairs specified by background con-
ditions. Then:
(R10p)Op, for p a practition, is correct at t just in case p is required by n at
w at every g(t)- maximal <w, n> in f(t).
(I ignore some complications about how the ranking function g interacts
with n.) So, ‘Devrim (morally) ought to go home’ is correct at t just in case p is re-
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quired at every morally best pair <w, n> in the set of world-norm pairs specified
by the background conditions in t. (R10d) and (R10p) together yield:
(R10)Op is correct at a world t just in case p is correct at every g(t)-maximal
<w, n > in f(t).
The discussion of semantics for ‘ought’ which precedes the discussion of
R10 is useful, if not entirely surprising, to those familiar with recent work on
modal verbs. Chrisman’s main objections to alternatives are that they (a) stum-
ble on dilemmas about obligation, (b) lack the ability to capture both agentive
and nonagentive senses of ‘ought’ in a natural and nondisjunctive fashion, and
(c) have trouble with nonideal contexts. Chrisman’s analysis, designed explicitly
to satisfy (b), has the additional virtue of avoiding both (a) and (c) in a natural
fashion. Following Kratzer, the ranking function g might rank highest world-
norm pairs which are nonideal, solving (c).We can solve (a) foragentive ‘ought’ claims
since g might rank highest world-norm pairs whose norms demand inconsistent
actions.
There is a slight technical problem here. According to Chrisman, g ranks
world-norm pairs in terms of how well the relevant standard is met when the
relevant agent does what is required of them by n (148). However, if n demands
impossible things, there is no case where the agent does all of what is required
of them. Presumably, g should evaluate how well the consequences of what the
relevant agent does meets the standard, whether or not they satisfy all of n’s
demands. Putting this aside, this account pushes the question of whether di-
lemmas exist out of formal semantics and into the domain of substantive ethics,
as we are not required by Chrisman’s solution to think that any g would so rank
world-norm pairs. This is a nice result in keeping with Chrisman’s goal of dis-
tinguishing substantive ethical and metasemantical projects from the project
of developing a linguistically adequate compositional semantics for ‘ought’. His
solution does not generalize to nonagentive ‘oughts’ since their prejacents are
typically propositions which are evaluated for truth at possible worlds. Some will
find this a good result as agentive ‘oughts’ are the natural source of normative di-
lemmas. Some will want more.
Chrisman claims as a crucial advantage of his semantics that R10, applying
to both propositions and practitions, is not an ambiguity or polysemous analy-
sis, unlike accounts which explicitly provide distinct lexical rules for different uses
of ‘ought’ (149, secs. 2.3, 5.2). However, the ability to formulate a compositional
rule which applies to both practitions and propositions is not sufficient to avoid
polysemy. After all, some ‘ought’ claims are really evaluated by R10 in terms of what
is required by a set of norms whereas others are really evaluated in terms of what
is true at a world. R10 is thus intuitively, if covertly, polysemous as it is naturally
factorable into two distinct, but related, lexical entries.
Variations on R10 are possible as well. It isn’t clear to me, for example, that
Chrisman’s detour through Castañeda-style practitions is required. As far as the
linguistic argument of the book is concerned, we could posit a semantic distinc-
tion between suitably structured agentive and nonagentive propositions, replac-
ing R10p with something like:
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(R10pa)Op, for p an agentive proposition, is true at t just in case the agent of
p is required by n to bring it about that p in w at every g(t)-maximal <w, n>
in f(t).
Chrisman might claim that R10pa and R10d together constitute a less uni-
fied analysis of ‘ought’ than R10. But, even if true, this seems outweighed by the
theoretical gain in using only propositions in analyzing ‘ought’. ‘Barry ought to
be pirouetting’ doesn’t intuitively encode imperatival content of the type practi-
tions aremeant to capture, unlike the statement of intention ‘I will go to Istanbul’,
somakinguse of practitions to capture the former requires, perhaps unnecessarily,
disrespecting or explaining away these intuitions.
Overall, chapters 2–5 constitute an extremely useful and slightly idiosyn-
cratic introduction to the semantic analysis of ‘ought’ in both philosophy and
linguistic semantics as well as a fairly convincing abductive argument in favor of
something like R10—R10 (or a close cognate) looks significantly less theoreti-
cally costly than alternatives. I have not detailed his criticisms of the alternatives,
but the reader will find the discussion sensible and the landscape well surveyed.
The reader is cautioned to read the footnotes carefully since they contain much
substantive material.
Turning now to metasemantics, Chrisman quickly dismisses two alternatives
to his view: global representationalism and expressivism. The former interprets
R10’s structure as more or less directly representing the world as containing moral
properties, possible worlds, and so on. I am broadly sympathetic to his reasons
for rejecting this view—it is difficult to accept that R10 commits us to actual pos-
sibilities and normative properties—though this is more a matter of philosophical
taste than principled argument. Chrisman is more sympathetic to a local version
of representationalismwhich acknowledges that some expressions, such as ‘ought’,
encode what Chrisman glosses as “conceptual manipulations”(166). He does com-
plain that the notion of a conceptual manipulation is underspecified and vague,
though both expressivism and his own preferred metasemantics seem to be local
representationalist views where ‘conceptualmanipulation’ is further specified.More
would have been appreciated here; in particular, exploration of other local repre-
sentationalist options would have been illuminating.
Chrisman glosses expressivism as an ideationalist metasemantics—semantic
rules like R10 are articulations of how we should think when uttering ‘ought’-
claims—along with the claim that what we ought to think when uttering ‘ought’
claims involves directive instead of descriptive content. In my view, this recent
trend of interpreting metaethical expressivism as an ideationalist view is a seri-
ous mistake, conflating a program in linguistic (meta-)semantics dating back to
Grice with the radical picture of the constitutive function of normative thought
and talk expressivists have championed. Expressivism claims that the function
of normative discourse is to express our evaluative or directive attitudes, idea-
tionalism claims that the content of normative claims is derived from what we
should think when so claiming. Expressivism, by itself, makes no claims about
the content of normative claims and ideationalism, by itself, makes no claim about
the function of normative discourse. The two should be separated, even if some
theorists accept both.
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Chrisman briefly raises (but does not discuss in detail) some standard is-
sues for this kind of expressivist metasemantics, such as the Frege-Geach prob-
lem. More interesting is his suggestion that expressivists have trouble accommo-
dating the distinction between agentive andnonagentive readings of ‘ought’-claims
since not all ‘ought’-thoughts are intuitively directive. Just consider ‘Erdoğan ought
to be in jail’. This is a nice problem, but one affecting primarily the plan-oriented
expressivism developed by Gibbard. Those who treat the function of normative
thought and talk as the expression of evaluative attitudes like approval and dis-
approval instead of directive attitudes like plans or intentions will welcome this
problem for their competition.
Chrisman’s own metasemantics takes a middle path between global repre-
sentationalism and expressivism, preserving the valuable aspects of each. On
the one hand, he wants to be able to respect the most sophisticated work in lin-
guistic semantics about the meaning of ‘ought’. This is easiest to do on the local
representationalist metasemantic picture since it interprets nonnormative prop-
ositions standardly as truth-apt representations of the world. On the other hand,
he wants his metasemantics to be resolutely antidescriptivist about normative
claims and respect the motivational and psychological aspects of normative
thought taken seriously by expressivists. The result is a version of inferentialism
where certain bits of language make explicit commitments to implicational con-
nections. ‘Ought’ claims are “an articulation of what one is committed to in virtue
of using the [‘ought’-sentence] to make an assertion in ordinary discursive prac-
tice” (186).
Semantic rules like R10 articulate ‘a position in the space of implications’—
a set of implications—which we are committed to in virtue of our use of ‘ought’
claims. That is, ‘ought’ gets “its content from being usable to acknowledge in-
ferential connections between more basic items rather than to refer to things in
the world” (197). Chrisman only gives a couple of tentative examples of such con-
nections and neglects the difference between the action of inference and the rela-
tion of implication, so it is difficult to evaluate this part of his metasemantical view.
Still, I worry that there is far too little agreement about what we are committed
to doing when accepting ‘ought’ claims to support an inferentialist metaseman-
tics for ‘ought’, unlike ‘and’, ‘or’, and ‘not’.
Unlike the global representationalist view, we are never told explicitly how
to interpret the semantic machinery involved in R10 in terms of the inferential-
ist metasemantics. On the representationalist picture, there is a specifiable real
content of ‘ought’ claims—representations of normative reality—which interpret
the machinery in R10. Similarly, for the expressivist, the real content of ‘ought’-
claims, so far as there is such a thing, can be described in terms of plans or en-
dorsements. In both cases, it is possible to explain why R10 is the way it is in terms
of the underlying metasemantics (though adequately matching an expressivist
metasemantics to something like R10 is nontrivial.)
We are not told how the inferentialist metasemantics interprets mecha-
nisms like the ranking function g or ‘being required by n’. Since it isn’t clear
how to interpret R10 in terms of an underlying space of implications, it’s not
clear what the inferentialist picture takes the real content of ‘ought’-claims to
be. One might worry that the gap between the favored formal semantics and an
inferentialist metasemantics is simply too wide. This is the reason that inferen-
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tialists in the logical tradition—such as the intuitionists—have often treated for-
mal semantics as a useful tool for modeling real content, but one which plays
no substantive role in the explanation of our actual understanding of the mean-
ing of the relevant fragments of language. Chrisman seemingly wants his formal
semantics to do more, but it is unclear exactly how to connect it to his favored
metasemantical picture. If it is to domore, then the formal machinery needs precise
interpretation in terms of the underlying metasemantics.
One potential way of filling this gap without directly interpreting the ma-
chinery in R10 treats notions like ‘correct’ as insubstantial placeholders, using a
few constitutive rules or entire sets of implications governing the behavior of ex-
pressions like ‘ought’ (207) and the requirement that rules or implications be
correctness-preserving to implicitly define the meaning of ‘ought’ and thereby
specify rules like R10. Historically, this approach has been beset with tremen-
dous difficulties, even for logical expressions like ‘or’ and ‘not’. The problem,
in brief, is that it is difficult to pin down a unique semantic rule like R10 in terms of
an underlying set of implications or constitutive rules. Even in the simplest cases,
any of many pairwise inconsistent semantic rules validates the relevant rules or
implications. For example, without disrespecting the classical consequence relation,
we can either treat a disjunction with two false disjuncts as sometimes true or,
alternatively, as always false. If Chrisman favors the approach just described, then
it would be useful to have some discussion of how he intends to finesse this prob-
lem. (For the logical case, see James Garson,What Logics Mean: From Proof Theory
to Model-Theoretic Semantics [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013] and
the references therein.)
Given this lack of detail, it is hard to evaluate the overall plausibility of Chris-
man’s metasemantical suggestion. I have focused on places I disagree with Chris-
man, but there is also much to agree with. Chapters 2–5 are a useful propaedeu-
tic to modal verbs, especially for metaethicists unfamiliar with work in linguistic
semantics, as well as a corrective to the idea that language-oriented metaethics
can ignore this work. Chrisman’s emphasis on the distinction between seman-
tics and metasemantics is both useful and timely. If his metasemantic picture is
sketchy, it is nonetheless intriguing and worthy of further detailed development.
I would recommend this book to anyone interested in the debate about the
meaning of normative expressions. It may frustrate, but the reader will be well
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Kai Draper works in the now dominant individualistic and reductive school of just
war theory, according to which the moral justifiability of both going to war and
killing in war is to be understood along the same lines as acts of self- and other-
defense between individuals. But Draper challenges a central pillar of the moral
view embraced by, as far as I know, all the other writers in the same school of just
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